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Polin: Securities
Law: Tenant Shares in Non-Profit Cooperative
Apartment
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXVIIII
SECURITIES LAW: TENANT SHARES IN NONPROFIT
COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS AND THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

United Housing Foundation,Inc. v. Forman, 95 S.Ct. 2051 (1975)
Respondents, tenant-shareholders in Co-op City, a nonprofit cooperative
housing corporation, sued the corporate managers and promoters, on behalf of
all Co-op City2 residents,' alleging violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws.4 The trial court, dismissing the suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, held that cooperative shares were not "securities"' 5 under
U.S. 388, 422-24 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule
- Can There Be an Effective Alternative? 47 L.A.B. BULL. 91, 94-99, 121-24 (1972); Note,
The Exclusionary Rule in Context, 50 N.C. L. REv. 1049, 1068-78 (1972). But see Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961) (the Court in overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), a decision which refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the states, made the following statement: "[W]e note that the second basis elaborated in Wolf in support of its failure
to enforce the exclusionary doctrine against the States was that 'other means of protection'
have been afforded 'the right to privacy.' . . . The experience of California that such other
remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States.").
58. But cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). "Although I would hesitate to abandon [the exclusionary rule] until
some meaningful substitute is developed, the history of the suppression doctrine demonstrates
that it is both conceptually sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective."
1. Defendants included: the project sponsor, United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit corporation composed of housing cooperatives, labor unions, and civic groups, promoting the growth of low and middle income housing; Community Services, Inc. (CSI), general
contractor and sales agent; Riverbay Corp., a non-profit cooperative subsidiary of UHF, which
issued the stock that respondents purchased; and certain individual officers and directors of
the corporate defendants. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (2d Cir.
1974).
2. Co-op City, a state-subsidized development in the Bronx, is the largest housing cooperative in the United States, with 15,400 apartments and 45,000 residents. 500 F.2d at 1248. For
general background and illustrations of Co-op City promotional materials, advertisements, and
leases, see P. ROHAN 8:M. RESKIN, 2A COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE Appendix D-8,
492.1-.35 (1974).
3. The Supreme Court stated that the 57 respondents sued on behalf of all apartment
owners. 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2056 (1975). The lower court opinions stated that the suit was brought
on behalf of all residents of Co-op City. 500 F.2d at 1248; 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
4. Respondents alleged that misleading statements in the Co-op City Information Bulletin
violated the antifraud provisions of §17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a)
(1970), §10(b) and rule lOb-(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970)
and 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1974). Respondents contended that rental increases above the Bulletin estimate, caused by inflation in construction costs, were to be absorbed by the developers. Additionally, respondents sued New York State and the State Financing Agency under
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970), and the court assumed pendent jurisdiction over
ten state law claims.
5. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" as, inter alia, "any .. .stock
... investment contract ... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
,security'...." 15 U.S.C. §77b(l) (1970).
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definitions found in the federal securities laws.6 The court of appeals reversed,
finding the shares to be "stocks" and "investment contracts," both forms of securities. 7 On certiorari," the Supreme Court of the United States reversed and
HELD, respondents' shares were not securities within the purview of the securities acts, and the trial court properly dismissed the complaint as not
cognizable in a federal court. 9
Purchasers of shares of cooperative apartments are entitled to the protection
offered by the federal securities laws only if those shares fit into the statutory
definitions of a security. 0 Judicial analysis of cooperative shares begins with a
determination of whether such shares are investment contracts within the
meaning of the securities laws. The Supreme Court, in SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp.," formulated vague guidelines for this definitional issue, finding determinative the "character the instrument is given in commerce by the
terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect.' 2 These guidelines formed the basis for the threeelement investment contract test set forth in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.13 Under
this frequently cited test, an investment contract requires "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party." 4 The emphasis shifts from the economic inducements offered by the
promoter in Joiner to the purchaser's expectation of profits in Howey.
According to a "literal" or "formal" definition of a security, the issuance of
a "stock certificate" by a corporation would bring the transaction within the
ambit of the securities laws, regardless of the actual characteristics of the certificate issued.' The mere denomination of a commercial instrument as a
6. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The trial court
ruled that respondents' shares were not "stocks" because they yielded no dividends, conferred
no voting rights proportionate to the number of shares owned, were not transferable, and had
no other common characteristics of stocks. The shares were not investment contracts since they
were not purchased with an expectation of profit.
7. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974). The cooperative

shares were held to be stocks because they were denominated as such. The shares were also
viewed as investment contracts under the court's expanded concept of profit, which encompassed tax deductions, savings from low rental charges, and income from commercial facility

leases.
8. 419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
9. 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975) (Brennan, Douglas, and White, JJ., dissenting).
10. The definition of security in §3(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§78c(10) (1970), has been found to be "virtually identical" with the definition in §2(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933, see note 5 supra. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); GlenArden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1974).
11. 320 U.S. 344 (1944).
12. Id. at 351. The Joiner test was reaffirmed in SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387
U.S. 202, 211 (1966).
13. 328 U.S. 293, 297-99 (1946).
14. Id. at 298-99. The test in Howey was based on the definition of a security set forth in
State v. Gopher Tire &Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920): "The placing

of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment is an 'investment' as that word is commonly used and understood."
15. The literal approach received initial support in dicta from Joiner: "Instruments may
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"stock" or "security" would invoke the protection of the federal securities
laws.16 The Court in Howey, however, did not intend to set forth a rigid
formula; its goal was a flexible principle, "capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised" by promoters. 7 Similarly, the Joiner
Court spoke of extending the securities laws beyond the "obvious and commonplace" and reaching "novel, uncommon, or irregular devices."' 18 In accordance
with these policies, the general trend since Howey has been to reject the
"literal" approach.'5 Substance has been favored over form, and emphasis has
20
been placed on economic reality.
The Howey test has been subjected to extensive criticism, particularly the
21
requirement that profits be derived solely from the efforts of third parties.
More crucial in situations involving cooperative shares is the need for an ex-

be included within any of these security laws definitions, as a matter of law, if on their face
they answer to the name or description." 320 U.S. at 351.
16. The failure of the certificates to satisfy the elements of the Howey test would not
prevent the certificates from being considered "securities" under the literal approach.
17. 328 U.S. at 299. Several cases support the contention of Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v.
Jones, 482 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1973), that "[the term 'security' must be given a broad and
flexible construction so that the remedial purpose of the anti-fraud provisions will be effectuated." Id. at 1098. See, e.g., SEC v. Haffenden-Rimer International, Inc., 496 F.2d 1192,
1193 (4th Cir. 1974); Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027, 1033 (2d
Cir. 1974).
18. 320 U.S. at 351.
19. The literal approach still finds some support among commentators. See, e.g.,
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 300 (3d ed. 1973) ("When a stock corporation is used, the securities acts literally apply, even though the profit motive is not dominant."); Anderson, Cooperative Apartments in Florida;A Legal Analysis, 12 U. MIAMI L. REV.
13, n.18 at 17-18 (1957). For examples of limited case law still supporting this approach, see,
e.g., 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F, Supp. 1171, 1173-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Movielab,
Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
Another argument is that, because SEC regulations, 17 C.F.R. §§230.35, 240.15a-2, exempt
certain cooperative shares from the securities laws, shares not specifically exempted are therefore securities. Professor Loss characterizes this argument as "too facile." 1 L. Loss, SEcuRTrrIEs
REGULATION 493-94 (2d ed. 1961).
20. The substantive approach searches beyond the mere denomination of a commercial
instrument as a "stock" or "note" and looks to the characteristics of the instrument in light
of the Howey test. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Andrews v. Blue,
489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640,
641-42 (D. Col. 1970).
21. A recent line of cases indicates that limited or insignificant participation by an investor in the enterprise management will not prevent the transaction from being treated as
an investment contract. This modification stems from the fear that minimal or insignificant
efforts by the investor might be required by a promoter to prevent the instrument from being
treated as a security. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir.
1974), rev'g, 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973); SEC v. Haffenden-Rimer International, Inc.,
496 F.2d 1192, 1193 (4th Cir. 1974); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 374-75 (10th Cir. 1973)
(investor was a consultant); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692-93 (3rd Cir. 1973);
Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 468-70 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 905 (1968); Mitzner v. Cardet International, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
("ministerial" efforts of investors). See also SEC Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735, 1736
(1973). Contra, Nash & Associates, Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, 484 F.2d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1973)
(franchise operator).
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pectation of profits. State courts dealing with cooperative shares under state
securities laws have viewed cooperative housing as a real estate surrogate serving the purpose of home ownership. 22 Accordingly, these courts have held that
the purchaser was looking for a home rather than an investment; cooperative
shares, lacking the attribute of profit expectation, have not been afforded the
protection of state securities laws. 23 Nevertheless, evidence of erosion of the
profit expectation requirement can be found, primarily in state and lower federal courts. Justice Traynor's majority opinion in Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski24 granted protection to purchasers of memberships in a country club
who were expecting benefits in the form of enjoyment rather than pecuniary
profits. The court in Silver Hills stated:
Only because he risks his capital along with other purchasers can there
be any chance that the benefits of club membership will materialize....
[The Act's] objective is to afford those who risk their capital at least a
fair chance of realizing their objectives in the legitimate ventures
whether
or not they expect a return of their capital in one form or an25
other.
Thus, the California supreme court replaced profit motive with a risk capital
26
theory.
A second form of erosion stems from an expansive concept of profit. Under
such a concept, profit need not be limited to traditional notions of participation in earnings or capital appreciation, but could include tax deductions,
savings in the form of low rent, and rent rebates derived from income from
commercial facilities operated on the premises of a cooperative development.27
22. See, e.g., Willmont v. Tellone, 137 So. 2d 610, 612 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962); Brothers v.
McMahon, 351 Ill. App. 321, 328, 115 N.E.2d 116, 118-19 (1st Dist. 1953); State v. Silverberg,
166 Ohio St. 101, 107, 139 N.E.2d 342, 344 (1956). But see Sire Plan Portfolios v. Carpentier,

8 Ill. App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 78 (1st Dist. 1956) (cooperative shares were held to be securities).
23.

Brothers v. McMahon, 351 Ill. App. 321, 326, 115 N.E.2d 116, 118 (1st Dist. 1953), held

that the shares were "merely mechanical incidents to the basic contract which was for the sale
of an interest in real estate." McMahon has been the subject of criticism. See Clinton, The
Illinois SecuritiesLaw as it Relates to Real Estate, 41 Cm. BAR REC. 65, 70 (1959); Hoisington,
Condominiums and the Corporate Securities Law, 14 HAsr. L. J. 241, 252 (1963).
24. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
25. - Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
26. For application of the risk capital theory, see El Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp.,
494 F,2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); State v. Hawaii Market
Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 649, 485 P.2d 105, 109 (1971). Contra, SEC v. Glenn Turner
Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 259-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970)
(While rejecting the application of the risk capital theory in the particular situation, the court
considered "the 'risk capital' analysis appropriate in some instances."). For further analysis
supporting the risk capital approach, see Coffey, The Economic Realities of a 'Security': Is
There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 WzVsr. REs. L. REv. 367, 376-78 (1967); Sobieski, Securities Regulation in California:Recent Developments, 11 U.C.LA. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1963).
27. One federal court of appeals has suggested that profits for securities could be in the
form of continuous employment and job security. Davenport v. United States, 260 F.2d 591,
593 (9th Cir. 1958). Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Troy v. Lur-
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This concept of profit was relied on in 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson.28
Further, the district court in Jakobson, favoring form over substance, found
the cooperative shares to be "stocks" under the literal approach. 2 9 The court

then applied the three-pronged Howey test and determined that the cooperative shares were investment. contracts. 3° 1050 Tenants Corp., however, did not
involve a nonprofit development, and in addition to the expanded profit forms
mentioned above, the purchasers expected capital gains on the resale of their
apartments. 3 1 The court carefully emphasized that the opinion did not extend
to nonprofit, state-subsidized developments.
The majority in the instant case analyzed cooperative shares by applying
both the Howey test and the literal approach accepted by the Second Circuit.
Finding that "the name given to an instrument is not dispositive," 32 the Su-

preme Court rejected the literal approach, viewing the Second Circuit's reliance on Joiner dicta as a misinterpretation of that case. 33 The Joiner court
had noted that "instruments may be included within [the definition of a security], as [a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or description. ' ' 34 Additionally, it had been noted in Joiner that a security "'might'
[be shown] by proving the document itself, which on its face would be a note,
a bond or a share of stock. "35 The instant Court, reinterpreting Joiner, found
that the earlier decision had emphasized the importance of economic reality
and that the purpose of the dicta was only to suggest that most instruments
bearing traditional title (such as "stock") would probably be covered by the
federal securities laws .3 The present Court found further support for its re-

interpretation by emphasizing the use of the conditional words "may" and
"might" in the Joiner dicta. 37
The Court cited "common sense" arguments as suggesting that respondents
were not deceived by the use of the word "stock" to designate their interests
in the cooperative.3 8 Since all of the common characteristics of stocks were
bermen's Clinic, 186 Wash. 384, 394-95, 58 P.2d 812, 816 (1936), found that "[p]rofit does

not necessarily mean a direct return by way of dividends, interest, capital account or salaries.
A saving of expense which would otherwise necessarily be incurred is also a profit to the
person benefited." See also, State ex ret. Russell v. Sweeney, 153 Ohio St. 66, 91 N.E.2d 13

(1950).
28. 365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
29. Id. at 1173-75.
30.

Id. at 1175-76.

31. Id. Unlike 1050 tenants, Co-op City tenants could not expect a capital gain upon resale because they were required to sell their shares to the management at the original purchase price. If the management refused to repurchase (an unlikely event), Co-op City tenants
could then sell the shares, at a minimal profit, to prospective tenant-purchasers. The court in
1050 Tenants, however, did not base its opinion on the capital gains element but treated
that element as just one of the profit forms present (the other elements were tax deductions,
rent savings, and income from commercial leases).
32. 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2059 (1975).
33. Id.
34. Id. quoting Joiner, 320 U.S. at 351. Emphasis added in principal case.
35. 95 S.Ct. at 2059, quoting Joiner, 320 U.S. at 355. Emphasis added in principal case.
36. 95 S. Ct. at 2059.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2060.
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absent,39 the purchasers could hardly have believed they were entitled to the
protection of the securities laws merely because of the inappropriate use of one
word.
More important than the rejection of the literal approach in defining a
security is the majority's assertion of a traditional concept of profit for the
purposes of the investment contract test. Because the requirement of a common
enterprise was accepted without discussion as satisfactorily fulfilled,40 the
opinion was devoted primarily to an examination of the purchaser's expectation of profits. The purchaser, attracted "solely by the prospect of acquiring a
place to live," was not seeking a financial return on his "investment."41 This
conclusion was buttressed by the emphasis the prospectus placed on the nonprofit nature of the development. The decisive role of the promotional prospectus in determining whether the purchaser expected a profit was crucial to
the Court's opinion; information and emphases within the prospectus were
virtually equated to the purchaser's knowledge and expectations of the development's functions. 42 The Court's holding implied that a cooperative development could conceivably avoid registration and disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws merely by failing to emphasize potential profit-yielding
43
aspects of the development.
The various profit expectation elements suggested by respondents were examined individually by the Court. Tax deductions, based on the tenants' proportionate share of the mortgage interest and real estate taxes paid by the cooperative corporation, were rejected as "profits" for lack of any "basis in law"
to so characterize them. 44 Furthermore, the deductions were the same as those
available to any homeowner paying interest on a mortgage. 45 The Court sug39. Co-op City tenant-shares could not be pledged or hypothecated, conferred no voting
rights in proportion to the number of shares owned, could not appreciate in value, and were
not negotiable. 95 S. Ct. at 2062.
40. The common enterprise could be inferred from the fact that the tenants in a cooperative are interdependent. If there are substantial tenant defaults on monthly payments of rent,
the corporate management may be unable to meet the mortgage payments unless there is a
sufficient excess of capital on hand from other sources (e.g., income from commercial leases).
Failure to meet the mortgage payments would result in the loss of ownership interests of all
tenants. The typical cooperative financing situation, with one mortgage for the entire development, should be contrasted with the financing of a condominium, where each individual
apartment unit will be separately mortgaged. See generally P. ROHAN & M. ESKIN, 1 CoNDOMINium LAW AND PRAecrCE §9.01 (1974).
41. 95 S. Ct. at 2063.
42. Id. at 2061.
43. See the disclosure and registration provisions of the securities laws: §§5-8, Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§77e-h (1970); §12, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §781
(1970). 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ignored the fact
that the prospectus made no reference to potential profits although emphasizing the goal of
home ownership.
44. 95 S.Ct. at 2062.
45. Id. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §216 places limitations on the deduction. The cooperative
corporation must have only one class of outstanding stock; each stockholder must be entitled,
by virtue of his stock ownership, to occupy for dwelling purposes a house or apartment owned
by the corporation; stockholders can only receive distribution from the earnings and profits
of the corporation except distribution from liquidation; and 80% of the gross income for the
taxable year must be derived from tenant stockholders.
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gested that even if the deductions were profits the Howey test would still not
be satisfied, since the profits would not "result from the managerial efforts of
others."

46

The second profit motive advanced by respondents - rental savings due to
state subsidization of the development -was similarly discarded as evidence of
47
profit expectation because such savings could not be liquidated into cash.
48
Furthermore, the savings did not result from the managerial efforts of others.
With both tax deductions and rental savings, the Court relied primarily on the
need for a traditional profit form (participation in earnings, capital appreciation) and secondarily on the argument that the deductions and savings were
not derived from the managerial efforts of others. This latter argument applies
only after a determination that certain forms of income are indeed "profits. " 41
By relying on this secondary argument, the Court proceeded on the assumption
that profit expectation existed, and in so doing, the Court expressed doubts as
to whether or not the profit forms involved were actually "profits."
The Court also held that a third benefit, potential rent savings from income
produced by the leasing of commercial facilities on the premises, did not meet
the requirements of an expectation of profit.50 Although acknowledging that
rental income would usually be considered "the kind of profit traditionally
associated with a security investment," the Court viewed the amount of such
income as insignificant. 51 The lack of reference to rental income in the prospectus and the fact that the leased facilities were used by the tenants led the
Court to conclude that the purpose of the commercial leases was not to establish a means of returning profits to the tenants but rather to provide easily
accessible and convenient services for the tenants.

52

Thus, the lack of profit

expectation by the purchaser compelled the Court to conclude that the purchase of the co-op was a real estate transaction rather than a security invest53
ment; the purchaser's primary desire was for a decent home for personal use.
The dissenting opinion, however, viewed the purchasers as having been induced into purchasing shares by one or more of the "profit" forms or monetary
46. 95 S. Ct. at 2062 n.19.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2062. SEC Release No. 5211, [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
178,446 at 80,976 (Nov. 30, 1971), approved of the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in State v.
Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971), and found it consistent with
the federal securities law. The majority opinion had observed that by emphasizing the requirement that profits be derived solely from the efforts of others, "courts [might] become entrapped in polemics over the meaning of the word 'solely' and fail to consider the more fundamental question whether the statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors

should be applied even to those situations where an investor is not inactive." Id. at 647, 485
P.2d at 108.
49. Under the Howey test, profits must be derived from the efforts of others. The efforts
of others are therefore irrelevant unless the prerequisite of the existence of profits is fulfilled.

50. 95 S.Ct. at 2062.
51. Id. The Court's concepi of traditional profits includes "capital appreciation resulting
from the development of the initial investment . . . or a participation in the earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds." Id. at 2060.

52. Id. at 2062-63.
53.

Id. at 2063.
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savings discussed above. All of those forms were found by the minority to be
ultimately dependent on efficient management, not on the efforts of the purchasers.54 They attacked the majority's homeowner-cooperative owner analogy
with respect to tax deductions by arguing that managerial skills in organizing
a cooperative corporation were essential in securing the owners tax benefits55
The dissent then employed "common sense" arguments and found no difference between money saved and money earned for the purpose of defining
profits.';" Different factual interpretations also lie at the foundation of the
minority opinion. The minority noted that the prospectus referred to both tax
deductions and the reasonable price of the housing, and also noted that the
57
income from commercial leases was substantial.
It is difficult to discern the true basis of the majority opinion. The Court's
primary argument was premised on generalized statements suggesting that the
profit elements in the instant case did not comport with traditional notions of
profit. The Court then proceeded on an alternative and contrary assumption
that the various elements were actually "profits," but that those "profits" failed
to satisfy the Howey test because the purchaser did not rely solely on the
managerial efforts of others. If this alternative rationale was advanced as a
serious basis for the opinion, several problems arise. Most noticeable is the
Court's assumed and unexplained premise that the purchaser's profits were not
the result of the managerial efforts of others. Left unresolved is the question
of what time period determines whether the managerial efforts of others predominate - the corporate organizational period or the period commencing
with tenant occupancy., Because tenants are entitled to tax benefits only if 80
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2065-66.
See note 58 infra.
95 S. Ct. at 2066, citing P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMUCS 618, 626 (9th ed. 1973).
95 S. Ct. at 2065-66.

58.

Berger, Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion,and the Need for Protection, 69

YALE L.J. 725, 763 (1960), finds the developmental stage (investigation and selection of site,
sale of fractional interests, reliance on promoter for information) to be the relevant period for
determining reliance on the efforts of others.
Implicit, however, in the recommendations in SEC Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735
(1973), concerning the sale of condominiums and "other types of similar units" (presumably
cooperatives) is the notion that the appropriate period for examining investor participation in
managerial efforts is during tenancy. This implication arises from the Commission's recommendation that condominiums be treated as securities only when there is a rental pool arrangement, with the management assisting the owner in leasing the unit for the owner's
financial benefit. Thus, the post-developmental period would control.
Additionally, the SEC Release did not treat income from commercial leases on the
premises as rendering the shares securities where such income was used solely to offset common area expenses or where such facilities were "incidental to the project as a whole," and
not a primary source of income for "owners of a condominium or a cooperative unit." 38 Fed.
Reg. at 1736 (emphasis added). It should be noted that Co-op City commercial lease facilities,
because of state subsidization, were required by statute to be merely "incidental and appurtenant" to the development. N.Y. PRIVATE HOUSING LAw §12(5) (McKinney Supp. 19741975). The SEC guidelines also recognized that the "facts and circumstances of each particular case" determine whether or not an offering is a security. 38 Fed. Reg. at 1736. Under
the SEC recommendations, Co-op City shares in the instant case apparently would not be
classified as securities. For recommendations by the SEC staff pursuant to these guidelines,
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percent of the cooperative corporation's income comes from tenant-shareholder
(as opposed to non-tenant investors),59 the corporate development period
should control since the tenant is completely dependent on the skill of the developers during that period. The developers must organize the cooperative in a
manner that will entitle the tenant to his deductions. The Court's homeownercooperative owner analogy therefore fails, because only in the case of the cooperative do the tax benefits derive from the managerial efforts of others.
Furthermore, the Court's emphasis on the investor's participation runs counter
to recent judicial liberalization of this element of the Howey test. 60
If the Court theorized that deductions and savings were not profits, we are
confronted by conclusory statements that ignore economic reality. The emphasis on the insubstantiality of the income from commercial leases was only a
quantitative response, leaving open the issue of whether substantial income
from that source would constitute profit.61 The Court was further bothered by
the fact that the profit motive, if it existed at all, was incidental to the goal of
home ownership and therefore could not be a significant or controlling factor.
Yet, where cooperative housing offers bargain rates, logic dictates that the two
goals can exist simultaneously.
It is generally acknowledged that cooperative apartment purchasers are in
need of protection.-2 The issue is whether to bestow protection through the
existing securities laws or through new legislation."3 The instant opinion
see these no-action letters: Sunriver Properties, Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 179,691 (Dec. 11, 1973) (rental pool arrangement not a security since developer did
not make the offer until after the purchase was completed); Culverhouse, [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 179,612 (Oct. 5, 1973); The Innisfree Corp., [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff79,398 (April 5, 1973) (no rental pool or other income
producing facilities).
59. See note 40 supra.
60. See note 19 supra.
61. The Court made no reference to the SEC recommendations on income from commercial leases on the premises. See note 58 supra.
62. See, e.g., P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, 2 COOPERATIVE HousING LAW AND PRACTICE §3A.05,
at 3A-27 (1974); Note, Cooperative Apartment Housing, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1407, 1425 (1948).
The comparable need for protection of condominium purchasers is similarly acknowledged.
See, e.g., H.R. 2347, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1975) ("certain consumer abuses have occurred
throughout the Nation which require the attention of the Federal Government.")
63. Pending Congressional proposals for regulating condominium sales include, H.R. 228,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974); H.R. 2347, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 4047, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); and S. 3658, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). These bills contain registration and dis-

closure provisions.
A number of commentators believe that existing federal securities laws are applicable to
cooperative apartment shares: See P. ROHAN : M. RESKIN, 2 COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND
PRACTICE §3A.05, at 3A-27 (1974); Anderson, Cooperative Apartments in Florida: A Legal
Analysis, 12 U. MIAMI L. REv. 13, 16-25 (1957); Coffey, The Economic Realities of a 'Security':
Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 WEST. RES. L. Rmv. 367, 377 (1967); Long, An
Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24
OKLA. L. REV. 135, 177 (1971); Note, Cooperative Apartment Housing, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1407,
1425 (1948). But see, Recent Development, Shares of a Cooperative Housing Corporation are
Securities, 62 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1528-29 (1974); Comment, Shares of a State-Subsidized NonProfit Cooperative Housing Corporation are Securities Under Federal Securities Laws, 53
TEXAS L. REv. 623, 630-31 (1975).
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perpetuates a rigid, unyielding Howey test contrary to the intentions of the
Howey Court, which viewed the test as a flexible, adaptable standard, capable
of effectuating the remedial purpose of the federal securities laws. 64 Commercial instruments continually assume new forms, and the instant Court's
failure to accept the liberal mandate of the Howey Court to protect the participants in such schemes can only serve to promote the unnecessary victimization of cooperative apartment purchasers.
RIcHARD POLIN
64. P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, 2 COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAw AND PRACTICE §3A.05, at 8A-27
(1974) find it justifiable to interpret "securities" to include cooperative shares "in light of the
broad language and remedial intent of the securities laws."
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